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an earlier version.I. Introduction and background
A recent paper by Dollar and Kraay (2001) finds that growth is good for the poor, but that
the income of the poor does not respond systematically to supposedly ‘pro-poor’ policies
such as public expenditure on education. Using a sample covering 137 countries over the
period 1950-99, they report that the income of the poor rises one-for-one with average
income. However, the primary educational attainment of the workforce (and the level of
primary enrollment, as in an earlier version of their paper) does not seem have a
measurable effect on the income of the poor beyond its effect on average income. Hence,
their work tends to suggest that a focus on education rather than on growth might be
misplaced as an essential component of any poverty-reduction strategy.
We test the robustness of the findings by Dollar and Kraay (2001) by using a broader
measure of human capital, which considers all levels of education and accounts for
international differences in the quality of education. Contrary to Dollar and Kraay, we find
that a higher stock of human capital increases the income of the poor, not only through its
effect on average income, but also through its effect on the distribution of income. Our
results appear to be robust to a number of alternative specifications. We interpret our
findings as suggesting that effective education policies would be a first-best poverty
reduction strategy.
Our interpretation of the empirical evidence seems to be more in line with a policy strategy
favored by the Development Report 2000 (World Bank 2000a) than the paper we seek to
criticize, which in fact emanated from the World Bank’s research department. With its
focus on attacking poverty, the Development Report goes significantly beyond the message
conveyed by Dollar and Kraay (2001) in that economic growth is merely considered to be a
necessary condition for achieving development and reducing poverty, but it is not deemed
a sufficient force. Effective anti-poverty strategies are meant to focus on three additional
issues: strengthening the participation of poor people in local decision-making and fighting
discrimination; reducing vulnerability of the poor to economic and natural shocks, sickness
and violence; and lastly, expanding economic opportunity and access to assets, such as
education, capital and land. An additional study by the World Bank on growth and poverty
(World Bank 2000b) further emphasized the centrality of education in the development
process. This study argues that human capital appears to be the main asset of most poor
people. Hence, investment in the human capital of the poor should be a powerful way to
augment their assets, redress asset inequality and reduce poverty.
Recent analyses of international differences in output per worker and growth rates have
also raised the awareness of the role of human capital in development, either as a direct or
as an indirect factor.1 The endogenous growth literature emphasizes the centrality of
human capital for innovation and technological progress. Most empirical cross-country
studies of long-run growth now include some measure of human capital. Regardless of the
underlying model, it is a fairly robust empirical finding that a country’s human capital is
almost always identified as an essential ingredient for achieving growth.2 However, the
1 See, e.g., Mankiw et al. (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Hall and Jones (1999).
2 See, e.g., Temple (1999) and Krueger and Lindahl (2000).2
quantitative impact of human capital on growth has not been precisely estimated up to
now.
The centrality of education in poverty-reduction policies stems from the belief that
education is a powerful equalizer. However, this belief cannot command strong theoretical
support. Ram (1989) reviews several theoretical frameworks linking the level of schooling
and its dispersion with income inequality, such as human capital or dual-economy-type
models. He finds that these models do not generate any clear theoretical hypotheses about
the effect of education on income inequality or absolute poverty. For instance, traditional
human-capital models of earnings provide two opposing insights with regard to the
relationship between education and income distribution. First, holding other things equal
these models imply a partial positive relation between the mean level of schooling and
earnings inequality, such that if the mean level of schooling rises, wages of educated
workers go up relative to wages earned by non-educated workers. But these models also
feature a partial positive relation between schooling inequality and earnings inequality in
that a more equal distribution of schooling leads to a more equal distribution of earnings.
Knight and Sabot (1983) show these effects in a dual-economy version of the human
capital model. Educational expansion has again two different effects on the distribution of
earnings and thus on overall income inequality as it raises the supply of educated labour.
On the one hand, the composition effect (or Kuznets effect) increases the relative size of
the group with higher education (and higher earnings) and thus tends to increase inequality.
On the other hand, the wage compression effect resulting from the relatively greater supply
of educated labour reduces inequality. Which effect dominates is again unclear and will
ultimately depend on the country’s level of development, the relative size of the different
educational groups, the degree of substitutability between workers with different levels of
education, and the wider social, political and economic aspects that affect the structure of
relative wages for different educational groups and the demand for labour.
To the extent that formal schooling is a significant component of human capital
investment, the recent endogenous growth literature might provide a more conclusive
theoretical framework regarding the relationship between educational expansion and
income distribution. Tamura (1991) explains income convergence in the developed world
by an endogenous growth model with human capital spillovers and heterogeneous agents.
In his model, human capital convergence results in income convergence. Human capital
convergence can be induced by educational expansion and the promotion of research
activity, and arises because for a given stock of existing knowledge, agents with below
average human capital have a higher rate of return to human capital investment.
With a more explicit focus on the formal schooling component of human capital
investment, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) construct an overlapping generations model
with heterogeneous agents that provides similar results. The human capital possessed by
each individual agent is a function of the parents’ stock of human capital, the level of
schooling acquired, and the quality of education provided, which is modeled as an
increasing function of tax revenue and determined endogenously by majority-voting.
Furthermore, they assume that the learning technology exhibits at least constant returns to
the quality of schools and the parents’ stock of human capital. While they are mainly
interested in comparing the effects of public and private investment in human capital on
growth and the distribution of income, they also show that income inequality
unambiguously declines over time in an economy with a public education sector where the3
quality of schooling is homogenous. Since the growth rate of any agent’s income is
inversely related to his initial level, income convergence results in their model.
By contrast, the endogenous growth model suggested by Lucas (1988) does not predict
income convergence. In this model, the human capital is supposed to generate internal and
external effects, where the latter means that the average level of education also contributes
to the productivity of all other factors of production. Assuming that a given percentage
increase in human capital requires the same effort independent of the level of human
capital already attained, the model generates sustainable growth through the accumulation
of human capital. Due to the presumed linearity in the production of human capital, the
model is capable of predicting permanent income differences of any size. Incomes would
not converge because the incentive to invest in human capital, as measured by the rate of
return to education, would be the same across all levels of income and human capital.
Given the various theoretical possibilities, it is probably not surprising that it has proved to
be difficult to identify a clear empirical link between education and income inequality up
to now. Intertemporal studies are rare in number and, as Ram (1989) notes, also do not
appear to point to general conclusions regarding the relationship between education and
inequality.3 Fields (1980) and Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) provide extensive
surveys of the empirical literature. Some older cross-section studies tend to confirm the
equalizing function of education. Ram (1984) challenges these findings by pointing out
that the empirical evidence appears generally inconclusive. More recently, a study by De
Gregorio and Lee (1999) based on international panel data finds that higher educational
attainment (and a more equal distribution of education) plays a significant role in making
the distribution of income more equal. Their finding appears to be in conflict with the
results by Dollar and Kraay (2001).
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the basic specification
for our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents our empirical results. Section 4 summarizes
our argument and points out directions for future research.
2. Data and specification of variables
2.1 Income distribution
As the source for internationally comparable data on the distribution of income, we draw
on the data set initially provided by Deininger and Squire (1996). This data set contains
Gini coefficients and cumulative quintile shares for 111 countries over a period of 40
years. In line with Dollar and Kraay (2001), we define the average per capita income of the
poor as the average per capita income of the poorest 20 percent of the population.
3 There may also exist several indirect mechanisms which influence the relation between educational
expansion and reduced inequality. In particular, there appears to be some empirical evidence for the favorable
impact of female education on reducing inequality. For instance, Ram (1989) notes that the expansion of
female schooling may improve the income distribution through increasing female labour force participation
as well as through reducing fertility.4
At this point, it is worth stressing that this definition does not provide a very homogenous
measure of poverty, neither across countries nor across time. For example, in Indonesia it
was only in 1997, just before the Asian crises, that absolute poverty (as defined by the
World Bank) was reduced to 20 percent of its population. In this case, our measure would
be an appropriate indicator of absolute poverty. However, countries such as Bangladesh
have 60 percent of their population living on less than one dollar a day. In that case, our
measure would only reflect how the poorest of the poor are faring—without capturing the
extent of absolute poverty. Another drawback of this measure is that its capacity to register
changes in the mass of the desperately poor across time is not very accurate. Again, if
extraordinary growth in Bangladesh were to halve absolute poverty, our measure may not
reflect any change at all. These ambiguities should be kept in mind when we use the term
incomes of the poor. Our approach focuses on relative poverty rather than on absolute
poverty.
The poverty data we use are taken from an updated version of the Deininger and Squire
(1996) data set. As a first step, we derive a sample of 102 countries for which ‘high
quality’ Gini coefficients are available. In order to be included in their ‘high quality’ data
set, an observation must be drawn from a published household survey, provide
comprehensive coverage of the population and be based on a comprehensive measure of
income or expenditure. We only use data around 1990 and restrict our sample to one
observation per country. For 89 of the 102 countries with high quality Gini coefficients,
there is also information about the share of income accruing to the poorest 20 percent of
the population (quintile 1). For these countries, we measure average per capita income of
the poor as average per capita income times the share of income accruing to the poorest
quintile divided by 0.2, where data for average per capita income are taken from the Penn
World Tables (PWT 1994).
We estimate the average per capita income of the poor for the remaining 13 countries in
our sample under the assumption that the distribution of income is lognormal.4 If so, we
can approximate the missing quintiles for these countries on the basis of Gini coefficients
by using
(1) y G y p ln ln + × - = g
where p y ln denotes the natural logarithm of average per capita income in the poorest
quintile of the population; G denotes the Gini coefficient; y ln denotes the natural
logarithm of average per capita income in the entire population, and 036 . 0 = -g is a
constant. The resulting numbers for the average per capita income of the poor are listed in
the appendix table, together with all other variables used in the analysis.
With our data set, we find that income of the poor and average income of the total
population are highly correlated. Regressing per capita income of the poor on average per
capita income yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.86 and a slope coefficient of 1.06 (with a
standard error of 0.04). Our result comes pretty close to the result of Dollar and Kraay
(2001) for their basic specification in levels, which they estimate for a sample of 269
pooled cross-country and time series observations. Hence using the same initial
4 Such a procedure was also suggested in an earlier version of Dollar and Kraay.5
specification but a much smaller sample which only includes one observation per country,
we also find that growth is good for the poor: higher average income would translate one-
for-one into higher income of the poor.5 The question is whether other variables could
have an additional positive impact on the income of the poor. Our focus is on education.
2.2 Education
In the empirical growth literature, it has been common practice to use enrollment rates or
average years of education as proxies for the change and the level in the stock of human
capital. Dollar and Kraay (2001), for instance, focus on years of primary education (and on
primary enrollment rates in an earlier version of their paper) as their measure of differences
in education across countries because deviations from complete primary school
enrollments are most likely to reflect the low enrollment among the poorest in society. But
given that international variation in primary education tends to be small relative to broader
measures of education, their finding of insignificant effects of education on incomes of the
poor may not be robust when compared with other measures of education which cover a
larger degree of international variation.
As discussed in Wößmann (2000), the standard specification of human capital in
macroeconomic production functions is problematic for methodological and empirical
reasons. For instance, a large body of microeconometric evidence based on the Mincerian
wage equation would suggest a semi-logarithmic and not a log-linear relation between
output per worker and average years of education, which, restricted to primary education,
is the measure used in the level equations of Dollar and Kraay (2001). In addition, rates of
return to education tend to decline with rising levels of schooling (Psacharopoulos 1994),
and the quality of a year of education may substantially differ across countries. All these
aspects should be taken into account when constructing an empirical measure of the stock
of human capital. Hall and Jones (1999) address these problems by specifying the stock of
human capital (H) in a way that is consistent with a microeconomic Mincerian wage
equation. Their measure of human capital is given by
(2) i
S r
i L e H
ij j  =
×
where j r is the world average of the Mincerian rate of return to investment in the j-th level
(primary, secondary, or higher) of education, ij S is average years of schooling taken from
Barro and Lee (1996) at the j-th level of education in country i,a n d i L is the number of
working-age persons in country i.
Gundlach et al. (forthcoming) improve this empirical measure of human capital by using
social rates of return to education derived on the basis of the so-called elaborate method as
reported in Psacharopoulos (1994) and by accounting for country-specific duration of each
level of education as reported in UNESCO’s Statistical Yearbook. In addition, Gundlach
5 This result does not change if we exclude countries with a population of less than 1 million persons in 1990
countries, if we exclude the 13 countries for which we estimated the income of the poor according to
equation (1), or if we exclude formerly socialist countries. In all cases, the estimated slope coefficient
remains statistically significantly indifferent from 1. This also holds if we exclude all three subsamples
together.6
et al. (forthcoming) use an index of schooling quality calculated by Hanushek and Kimko
(2000) on the basis of international cognitive achievement tests of students in mathematics
and natural sciences to account for international differences in the quality of education.
The resulting measure of human capital per working-age person in country i,w h i c hw e
also use in this paper, is given by
(3)




rP r ir SP r i Q
rP r i rS e c r S P r i S e c Q
if S Pri
if Pri S Pri Sec































ri P r ,
Sec r and
High r are world-average social rates of return to primary, secondary,
and higher education (20 percent, 13.7 percent, and 10.7 percent, respectively); Prii and
Seci are country-specific measures of the duration of the primary and the secondary level of
schooling; Si is average years of educational attainment in country i taken from Barro and
Lee (1996), and i Q is an index of schooling quality, measured on a 0 to 1 scale.6
Multiplying quantity of schooling by quality of schooling to arrive at a measure of quality-
adjusted schooling appears to be justified because estimated regression coefficients on
quantity and quality did not differ when the log values of these variables were entered
separately on the right-hand side of a conventional production function by Hanushek and
Kimko (2000).
3. Empirical results
To estimate the potential impact of quality-adjusted human capital on the incomes of the
poor, we estimate an OLS-regression which controls for the impact of average per capita
income. Accordingly, our regression equation reads
(4) () i iX a L H a y a c yp + + + = / ln ln ln 2 1
where i X denotes a set of further possible control variables. Without including any further
control variables, we find that the regression coefficients are statistically significant and
have the expected sign (Table 1, column (1)). The coefficient 1 a is statistically not
different from 1, which preserves the finding that growth in average income is translated
one-for-one in growth of income of the poorest quintile of the population. But in contrast
to Dollar and Kraay (2001) we find that the income of the poor increases with rising
quality-adjusted human capital. This distributional effect comes on top of the growth effect
of rising quality-adjusted human capital, which works through higher average income. Our
point estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in the stock of quality-adjusted human
capital per worker would increase the average income of the poor by an additional 3.2
percent.
6 For details of the calculation, including the imputation of missing values for selected countries, see
Gundlach et al. (1998). Their data set includes 1990 data, while our data set is adjusted where appropriate to
match as closely as possible the distribution data from Deininger and Squire (1996) for different years.7
Table 1
OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: yp ln
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Sample n=101 n=101 n=99 n=91 n=89
Adjusted
2 R 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88
s.e.e. 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42
Source: Authors’ compilation
To test the robustness of our basic result, we include further variables in our regression
equation (4). In most empirical growth studies, a measure of physical capital accumulation
is found to be a robust variable (Levine and Renelt 1992). We measure physical capital
accumulation (INV) as the average share of real investment in GDP in 1960-90.7 In our
specification, this variable yields a statistically insignificant negative regression coefficient
(column (2)). This result most likely reflects that the inclusion of average income as a
conditioning variable already accounts for the potential distributional effect of physical
capital accumulation on the income of the poor. But conditioning for average income
obviously does not fully account for the distributional effects of human capital
accumulation, since the estimated regression coefficient remains statistically significant
and more or less unchanged in size.
In further specifications, we include poverty-related variables such as the share of mining
in GDP (MINING) and the incidence of malaria in a country (MALARIA) as further checks
of the robustness of our results.8 A high share of mining in GDP may lead to a relatively
unequal distribution of income due to rent seeking activities, and hence to slower growth
(Rodriguez and Sachs 1999). The incidence of malaria may limit economic development
through poor health, high mortality, and absenteeism of the workforce. Accordingly,
Bloom and Sachs (1998) have argued for the importance of malaria in explaining African
poverty. However, we find statistically insignificant regression coefficients both for
MINING (column (3)) and for MALARIA (column (4)).
7 The share of real investment in GDP is taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT 1994).
8 The share of mining in GDP is taken from Hall and Jones (1999); the proportion of a country’s population
at risk of falciparum malaria transmission is taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001).8
Table 2
IV Estimates
Dependent Variable: y yp ln ln -














Sample n=86 n=100 n=86
Adjusted
2 R 0.08 0.08 0.08











Our basic result also remains intact if we enter all additional variables together (column
(5)). We still find that quality-adjusted human capital has a statistically significant positive
effect on the income of the poor in addition to the one-for-one effect of higher average
income on the income of the poor. To compare the effects of the two statistically
significant variables on the income of the poor more directly, the different units of
measurement have to be accounted for. Beta coefficients measure changes in all variables
in units of standard deviations. With a standard deviation of 1.21 of the dependent variable
( 21 . 1 = yp s ), our point estimates imply beta coefficients of 0.028 for quality-adjusted
human capital and of 0.053 for average income. This suggests that improving quality-
adjusted human capital by one standard deviation could generate about half of the effect on
the income of the poor that would result from changing average income by one standard
deviation.
We also consider the possibility that OLS-estimation of equation (4) might lead to upward
biased coefficients because the stock of quality-adjusted human capital is an endogenous
variable which depends, through the political process, on the level of the income of the
poor. For instance, in countries where the income of the poor is relatively high, relatively
more resources may be available for investment in education. In that case, the causality
could run from the income of the poor to the stock of quality-adjusted human capital, and
not the other way round as presumed in equation (4). A similar reasoning could also be
applied with respect to average per capita income, as discussed in Dollar and Kraay (2001).
However, they find that the possible endogeneity of average per capita income (ln y)d o e s
not cause an upward bias in the estimated regression coefficient. Since we estimate
basically the same regression coefficient on average per capita income of about 1 as do
Dollar and Kraay (2001), we impose their empirical result as restriction on equation (4)
such that
(5) () L H a c y yp / ln ln ln 2 + = -9
which we estimate by using the absolute distance of a country from the equator
(DISTANCE) and the mean temperature of a country (MEANTEMP) as instruments for our
human capital variable.9 These geographical variables can be considered as truly
exogenous. They may be useful instruments for human capital accumulation in so far as
they proxy for the institutional framework of a country, as suggested by Hall and Jones
(1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2000). If so, these variables should be correlated with ln
(H/L), but not with the error term of equation (5).
The results of our IV-estimation are presented in Table 2. In all three specifications, the
estimated effect of our human capital measure on the difference between the per capita
income of the poor and the average per capita income is positive and statistically
significant. When we use both instruments together, a chi-squared test on overidentifying
restrictions does not reject the underlying hypothesis that both instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term (critical value for 1 degree of freedom at the 5 percent level of
statistical significance: 3.84).
On average, our three IV point estimates imply that a 10 percent change in our measure of
human capital would generate a 3.7 percent increase in the average income of the poor
relative to average income (which may also rise because of an increase of human capital).
This distributional effect is larger than the effects estimated with OLS (see Table 1). A
possible interpretation of the difference between IV- and OLS-results is that a potential
positive effect of simultaneity on the estimated coefficient is outweighed by a potential
negative effect of measurement error. Hence taken together, our findings suggest that in
addition to its growth effect, improving the stock of human capital may have a substantial
distributional effect on the average income of the poor.
4. Outlook
From a political economy perspective as well as according to some endogenous growth
models, a more equal distribution of income should be conducive to growth if it reduces
social conflict and guarantees a greater protection of private property rights. If, for
instance, imperfect capital markets are responsible for observed inequality, then a certain
amount of redistribution is believed to enhance growth and welfare because it would
transfer resources to agents with potentially higher returns to investment. Redistribution
through state-funded access to primary and secondary education for all children might be
an efficient why to implement such a transfer of resources.
Overall, our empirical results confirm that education is not distribution-neutral. Education
seems to improve the income distribution and thus may allow the poor to benefit from
growth to a greater extent. Accordingly, a focus of economic policies on education in order
to reduce poverty and to speed up development appears to be justified. Our empirical
findings indicate that improving the quality of education rather than merely expanding
access to education should play a crucial role in development strategies.
9 Absolute distance from the equator is taken from Hall and Jones (1999); mean temperature is taken from
McArthur and Sachs (2001).10
Several issues for future research are immediately apparent from our analysis. First, the
direction of causality between inequality and human capital accumulation somehow
remains an open question. Notwithstanding our results in Table 2, more empirical research
based on alternative instrumental variables is probably necessary to support the
interpretation given in our paper. Second, while our findings provide an encouraging
impetus for the use of education policies as part of anti-poverty programs, a rigorous
theoretical framework supporting such a claim is still missing.
Third, and most importantly, highlighting the importance of education policy, as we do,
should be accompanied by a more precise identification of effective education policies that
would actually generate the expected effects. This is an important caveat because recent
empirical evidence for OECD countries and for selected East Asian countries tends to
suggest that additional schooling resources do not automatically guarantee improved
schooling outcomes (Gundlach et al. 2001; Gundlach and Wößmann 2001). The
international empirical evidence presented in Wößmann (2001) indeed reveals that
schooling outcomes depend more on schooling institutions than on schooling resources.
Hence creating efficient schooling systems is probably more important for improving the
stock of human capital than increasing schooling expenditure.
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Algeria 1988 941 2769 1,400 0,214 0,053 0,000 19,30 0,408
Australia 1990 3322 14445 9,140 0,286 0,038 0,000 20,90 0,358
Bahamas (a) 1989 1910 12610 3,808 0,094 0,006 n.a. n.a. 0,247
Bangladesh 1989 653 1375 1,503 0,042 0,000 0,158 25,68 0,265
Barbados (a) 1979 717 6373 5,297 0,123 0,006 n.a n.a. 0,131
Belgium 1988 5610 13232 6,636 0,238 0,000 0,000 8,40 0,565
Bolivia 1990 466 1658 1,619 0,165 0,075 0,005 21,50 0,169
Botswana 1986 479 2662 1,379 0,191 0,533 0,390 21,07 0,239
Brazil 1989 530 4271 1,743 0,193 0,017 0,194 23,70 0,217
Bulgaria (c) 1990 3269 6203 4,543 0,411 n.a 0,000 10,70 0,420
Burkina Faso 1994 203 514 1,462 0,076 0,001 1,000 28,10 0,134
Cameroon (b) 1983 230 1342 1,427 0,085 0,088 1,000 24,43 0,119
Canada 1990 6474 17173 7,692 0,239 0,034 0,000 -0,20 0,486
Chile 1989 807 4361 1,921 0,196 0,155 0,000 13,40 0,373
China 1990 464 1324 4,138 0,203 0,045 0,006 11,70 0,329
Colombia 1988 609 3293 1,990 0,158 0,062 0,250 22,50 0,053
Costa Rica 1989 690 3451 2,903 0,162 0,051 0,000 25,10 0,111
Côte d’Ivoire 1988 481 1419 1,805 0,112 0,029 1,000 26,00 0,061
CSSR(c) 1988 2445 4110 8,234 0,276 0,040 0,000 n.a. 0,491
C. Afr. Rep. 1992 51 514 1,146 0,065 0,030 n.a. n.a. 0,043
Denmark 1992 3861 14091 11,377 0,258 0,006 0,000 6,80 0,619
Djibuti (a,b) 1996 345 1362 1,805 0,095 0,000 n.a. n.a. 0,115
Dom. Rep. 1989 510 2430 1,880 0,152 0,024 0,000 25,60 0,206
Ecuador 1994 859 3206 2,532 0,220 0,098 0,137 19,10 0,023
Egypt 1991 833 1913 1,503 0,046 0,034 0,000 22,60 0,333
El Salvador 1977 561 2244 1,318 0,083 0,002 0,000 23,57 0,153
Ethiopia 1996 111 312 1,462 0,049 0,001 0,750 n.a. 0,100
Fiji (a,b) 1977 765 3532 3,294 0,174 0,039 n.a. n.a. 0,173
Finland 1991 4926 12663 8,598 0,348 0,004 0,000 0,20 0,669
France 1984 3959 12034 4,076 0,272 0,005 0,000 11,20 0,543
Gabon 1977 895 6170 2,244 0,218 0,215 1,000 24,50 0,372
Gambia 1992 160 1735 1,153 0,050 0,000 1,000 25,66 0,132
Germany 1984 4054 12302 4,323 0,279 0,005 0,000 7,20 0,535
Ghana 1989 314 902 1,359 0,062 0,016 1,000 26,35 0,074
Greece 1988 1999 6459 4,707 0,247 0,017 0,000 16,90 0,423
Guatemala 1989 224 2137 1,551 0,091 0,003 0,012 21,70 0,163
Guinea (b) 1995 183 783 1,462 0,061 0,077 1,000 24,43 0,130
table continues…14
Guinea Bissau 1991 61 593 1,462 0,172 0,000 1,000 26,49 0,132
Guyana (a) 1993 343 1095 3,259 0,242 0,087 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras (b) 1990 197 1377 1,571 0,139 0,014 0,011 25,40 0,158
Hong Kong 1991 3814 15601 10,327 0,199 0,001 0,000 22,60 0,252
Hungary(c) 1991 1650 4947 8,777 0,263 0,038 0,000 9,00 0,474
India 1990 575 1264 1,372 0,138 0,017 0,281 25,90 0,281
Indonesia 1990 908 1974 2,065 0,165 0,121 0,426 26,80 0,073
Iran (b) 1984 860 4027 1,221 0,150 0,049 0,152 23,30 0,354
Ireland 1987 1859 7541 4,687 0,247 0,009 0,000 9,20 0,607
Italy 1989 5214 12488 3,397 0,280 0,002 0,000 13,40 0,505
Jamaica 1990 761 2545 2,553 0,218 0,089 0,000 26,50 0,201
Japan (b) 1990 4063 14331 9,758 0,342 0,003 0,000 14,60 0,397
Jordan 1991 1039 3212 2,573 0,139 0,037 0,000 18,10 0,351
Kenya 1992 155 914 1,434 0,155 0,002 0,910 22,60 0,006
Korea, R. 1988 2072 5607 7,713 0,232 0,007 0,000 13,10 0,417
Laos 1992 678 1420 1,963 0,024 n.a. 0,863 25,41 0,165
Lesotho 1987 136 949 2,024 0,111 0,003 0,000 n.a. 0,295
Luxembourg (a) 1985 5764 13175 4,289 0,297 0,003 n.a. n.a. 0,498
Madagascar 1993 186 634 1,462 0,014 0,077 1,000 23,30 0,211
Malawi (b) 1993 58 543 1,475 0,098 0,081 1,000 22,00 0,176
Malaysia 1989 1070 4674 3,630 0,229 0,103 0,467 26,70 0,036
Mali (b) 1994 66 458 1,125 0,061 0,012 0,620 29,30 0,139
Mauritania 1988 139 788 1,462 0,151 0,069 25,300 25,30 0,199
Mauritius 1991 1996 5959 3,417 0,105 0,001 0,000 23,50 0,225
Mexico 1989 891 5566 2,546 0,165 0,032 0,000 19,00 0,186
Morocco 1991 736 2241 1,832 0,090 0,029 0,000 18,50 0,373
Nepal 1984 424 930 1,146 0,053 0,001 0,047 19,00 0,308
Netherlands (b) 1989 4508 13029 6,059 0,247 0,027 0,000 8,60 0,576
New Zealand 1990 2636 11513 14,527 0,246 0,011 0,000 12,80 0,410
Nicaragua 1993 297 1415 1,468 0,114 0,041 0,044 26,63 0,136
Niger 1992 189 1043 1,091 0,087 0,076 0,660 28,40 0,154
Nigeria 1992 323 978 1,482 0,125 0,208 1,000 26,65 0,073
Norway 1991 4063 15047 7,507 0,310 0,079 0,000 3,20 0,666
Pakistan 1988 601 1396 1,523 0,106 0,006 0,527 23,50 0,346
Panama 1989 279 2785 4,097 0,203 0,001 0,138 27,50 0,102
Peru 1986 678 2188 2,560 0,177 0,022 0,002 20,50 0,131
Philippines (b) 1991 455 1749 2,539 0,153 0,019 0,617 26,50 0,155
Poland (c) 1990 1818 3820 12,173 0,327 0,043 0,000 6,40 0,502
Portugal 1990 2131 7478 1,976 0,227 0,033 0,000 16,00 0,431
Puerto Rico 1989 1265 8727 2,951 0,222 0,001 n.a. n.a. 0,203
Romania (c) 1989 1019 2043 4,529 0,290 0,048 0,000 8,40 0,442
Rwanda 1983 404 834 1,235 0,039 0,002 1,000 n.a. 0,023
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Senegal 1991 196 1120 1,366 0,051 0,005 1,000 27,20 0,164
Seychelles (a,b) 1984 517 2811 2,244 0,163 0,001 n.a. n.a. 0,046
Sierra Leone 1968 151 1097 1,084 0,015 0,061 1,000 26,20 0,097
Singapore (b) 1989 2715 11059 5,407 0,309 0,001 0,000 26,20 0,015
South Africa 1993 310 3068 2,889 0,184 0,111 0,000 17,70 0,324
Soviet Union (c) 1989 3449 7741 6,080 0,384 0,015 n.a. n.a. 0,556
Spain 1989 3875 9238 3,657 0,253 0,006 0,000 15,90 0,416
Sri Lanka 1990 935 2096 2,614 0,091 0,014 0,200 27,60 0,076
Sudan 1968 337 2420 1,064 0,135 0,000 0,810 28,50 0,140
Sweden 1990 5462 14762 7,644 0,235 0,003 0,000 2,40 0,659
Taiwan 1990 3128 8063 n.a 0,220 0,043 0,000 23,30 0,252
Tanzania 1993 164 478 1,462 0,107 0,002 1,000 25,09 0,024
Thailand 1990 716 3580 2,786 0,174 0,017 0,471 27,20 0,153
Trinidad 1981 2013 11738 3,705 0,124 0,157 0,000 25,90 0,116
Tunisia 1990 853 2910 1,681 0,147 0,079 0,000 19,60 0,409
Turkey 1987 902 3441 1,654 0,211 0,020 0,000 13,20 0,458
Uganda 1992 186 548 1,256 0,024 0,001 1,000 21,57 0,003
United Kingdom 1990 5141 13217 8,097 0,181 0,022 0,000 8,80 0,572
United States 1990 4152 18054 6,862 0,214 0,018 0,000 11,20 0,382
Venezuela 1990 1093 6055 2,264 0,178 0,110 0,070 24,80 0,109
Yugoslavia (c) 1990 1665 4541 3,980 0,298 0,025 0,000 n.a. 0,437
Zambia 1991 195 699 1,887 0,219 0,204 1,000 21,30 0,144
Zimbabwe 1990 235 1182 1,482 0,172 0,060 0,700 16,90 0,199
Source: Authors’ compilation
Note: (a) Population of less than 1 million in 1990; (b) Income of the poor estimated on the basis of equation
(1); (c) Formerly socialist country. For definition of variables, see text